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Abstract 
Offshore wind technology has recently undergone rapid deployment in the UK. And yet, up 
until recently, the UK was considered a laggard in terms of deploying renewable energy. 
How can this burst of offshore activity be explained? An economic analysis would seek signs 
for newfound competitiveness for offshore wind in energy markets. A policy analysis would 
highlight renewable energy policy developments and assess their contribution to economic 
prospects of offshore wind. However, neither perspective sheds sufficient light on the 
advocacy of the actors involved in the development and deployment of the technology. 
Without an account of technology politics it is hard to explain continuing policy support 
despite rising costs. By analysing the actor networks and narratives underpinning policy 
support for offshore wind, we explain how a fairly effective protective space was constructed 
through the enrolling of key political and economic interests.  
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1. Introduction,
Renewable energy technologies (RET) are key to tackling climate change (IEA 2011; IPCC 
2011). One technology prominent in several European countries is offshore wind (OSW). The 
European Wind Energy Association anticipates 150 GW of capacity by 2030 (EWEA 2011). 
Globally, the UK leads in deployment: installed capacity reached 2.7GW in 2012 (DECC 
2012). The government expects a capacity of 18GW by 2020 and 40 GW by 2030 (DECC 
2011: 42). This comes as quite a change as the UK had hitherto been lagging behind in the 
deployment of RET (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006; Toke 2011).  
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One explanation for the rapid deployment might be that learning and competition have driven 
down costs making the technology competitive (Neij 2008; Junginger, van Sark et al. 2010). 
This is clearly not the case: OSW remains amongst the most expensive RET (IEA 2012) and 
costs have increased (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010; IEA 2012b). A second possible 
explanation is that policy support makes the technology investible, which is the case in the 
UK (Toke 2011; IEA 2012b). However, analysis needs to explain why these policies came 
about and how technology advocates were able to shape a favourable space for deployment. 
This is a distinct gap in the existing literature (Markard and Petersen 2009; Green and 
Vasilakos 2011; Toke 2011; Luo, Lacal-Arantegui et al. 2012). 
For insights into technology advocacy, we turn to the literature on the importance of niches 
within wider processes of socio-technical transformation (see Raven 2007; Schot and Geels 
2008; Smith, Voß et al. 2010; Markard, Raven et al. 2012). In this literature niches are 
conceptualised as ‘protective spaces’ where real world experimentation takes place (Kemp, 
Schot et al. 1998). Smith and Raven (2012) suggest a particularly relevant framework. They 
argue that understanding RET deployment requires analysis to trace recursively between the 
agency creating space for development, and how the characteristics of that space shape the 
socio-technical configuring1: the further development of the technology within a social 
context (Figure 1).  
                                                
1 Configuring refers to the fact that the shape of emerging technologies is often not yet settled in the early stages 
of development (e.g. there is no dominant design, business model, or developed supply chain yet). 
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Figure 1: Protective space and socio-technical configuring: a recursive relationship 
 
Taking this framework as the point of departure, we answer two questions: 
1. How and by whom has ‘protective space’ been created for offshore wind in the UK? 
2. What impact has the ‘protective space’ had on offshore wind developments in the 
UK? 
 
The development of OSW is only one piece of the puzzle of electricity system 
transformations in the UK (Foxon, Hammond et al. 2010; Foxon 2013). Policy makers are 
trying to meet the challenging RE and climate change targets by using a variety of support 
instruments for RETs, nuclear, carbon capture and storage as well as energy efficiency. 
Controversies abound around the degree of centralisation or decentralisation as well as the 
relative prominence of these technologies in different decarbonisation pathways. Many of 
these technologies have received increased policy attention over the last couple of years. Our 
analysis focusses on OSW as this technology has been most successful in deployment. 
Support for OSW has complemented rather than replaced support for other technologies. 
Analysis of the interactions between OSW and other low carbon technologies is an 
interesting subject but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The framework and methodology are explained in the next section before turning to a history 
of OSW (section 3). Section 4 analyses the actor networks and narratives constructing 
‘protective space’ for OSW, answering the first question. Section 5 analyses how this 
‘protective space’ shaped developments in OSW, answering the second question. This is 
followed by a discussion of results in section 6 and conclusions in section 7. 
2. Analytical,framework,and,methodology,
2.1 Protective,space,
The transitions literature analyses the transformation of socio-technical regimes in energy, 
transport or food systems (Geels 2002; Elzen, Geels et al. 2004; Smith, Stirling et al. 2005; 
Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Smith, Voß et al. 2010). A key argument is that sustainable 
technologies often fit poorly within established regimes (e.g. in terms of price, performance, 
consumer preferences) (Smith 2007). Therefore emphasis is put on the provision of 
‘protective space’, i.e. niches, to improve performance and societal embedding of 
technologies, and facilitate wider breakthrough into dominant regimes (Kemp, Schot et al. 
1998).  
2.2 Nurturing,,shielding,and,empowering,as,processes,of,socio?
technical,configuring,
Smith and Raven (2012) propose a framework for analysing ‘protective space’ which 
suggests productive niches require three processes: nurturing, shielding and empowering. 
They argue that successful nurturing involves learning, the building of positive, robust 
expectations, and the formation of broad and deep networks. Shielding processes provide 
temporary relief for niches against adverse selection environments of incumbent regimes. 
Empowering involves actors network who represent niches positively to the wider social 
world in order to mobilise resources. Empowering can be achieved through two processes: 
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either the new socio-technical configuration becomes increasingly competitive under the 
existing selection environment (‘fit and conform’) or the selection environment is changed in 
order to better accommodate the characteristics of the novel socio-technical configuration 
(‘stretch and transform’). The framework not only focusses on niche-level processes 
(nurturing and shielding), but also explores niche-regime dynamics through the concept of 
empowering. Technology advocates engage in both inward-oriented work to improve the 
performance of the core technology as well as outward-oriented socio-political work to 
influence the status of the technology in the wider social world. 
 
Smith and Raven argue that evidence for these ideal-typical processes requires analysis of the 
actors, their networks and the narratives used to promote the niche. Narratives can help to 
create positive expectations about the niche, make claims for reforms and critique existing 
regimes. Actors and their networks are important in studying the politics of creating 
‘protective space’ as it is actors who negotiate the mobilisation of resources, represent lessons 
to be drawn, lobby policy makers, and (re-)produce narratives. This framework has already 
been applied to explaining PV developments in the Netherlands (Verhees, Raven et al. 2013) 
and the UK (Smith, Kern et al. 2014). Here we apply it to the case of OSW. 
 
2.3 Methodology,
A case study methodology is appropriate for our aims, where we study a situation involving a 
complex and contemporary social phenomenon un-attributable to a clearly identified single 
cause (Yin 1994). The analysis used a process tracing approach to identify causal 
mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 6). The study is based on a systematic review of the 
academic literature, policy and stakeholder documents, relevant trade press and media articles 
(including ENDS, Real Power, BBC and Wind Power Monthly). The resulting history is 
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complemented with data on public R&D funding and deployment. The evidence was used to 
construct a timeline of developments. Semi-structured interviews with 13 stakeholders 
involved in OSW were conducted between April and May 2012 (see Appendix A) to explore 
why processes were happening and how these processes shaped the development of OSW. 
All interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed using the indicators specified in Figure 
2.  
Figure 2: Key concepts and indicators used for analysis 
Source: developed by authors, partly based on (Verhees, Raven et al. 2013) 
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3. A,history,of,UK,offshore,wind,developments,
3.1 1970?1980s:,Wind,considered,as,alternative,after,oil,crisis,
The oil crisis in the 1970s triggered a search for alternative energy sources in the UK. Using 
wind turbines to generate electricity was one of the options considered. During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s exploratory studies on OSW resources and wind farm design were 
undertaken (Gaudiosi 1996). The British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) was set up in 
1978. There was also academic interest in wind technology (interviewee 1). The UK 
government’s interest at the time was in developing offshore turbines. A R&D programme 
was initiated in the early 1980’s in partnership with the developer McAlpine. This led to the 
manufacturing of a vertical axis turbine in 1986. Also the Central Electricity Generating 
Board showed interest in developing ‘offshore wind power stations’ during the 1980s 
(interviewee 12). However, commercial and government support generally was equivocal and 
drops in the price of oil led to a loss of interest (Real Power, 2008: 35). Efforts subsequently 
focused on the development of onshore wind. The first onshore wind farm in the UK was 
constructed in 1990. 
 
3.2 1991?2000:,Taking,wind,from,onshore,to,offshore,
This period was characterised by the emergence of the first offshore wind farms (OSWF) in 
Denmark (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010) while UK policy continued to be characterised by the 
view that OSW was prohibitively expensive. R&D funding concentrated on technologies 
close to commercialisation while OSW technologies were deemed unlikely to be economic 
even by 2025 (ENDS 1994). Nevertheless, in 1995 the East of England Development Agency 
provided £3.65m alongside £500,000 from Renewables East to sponsor a Centre for Offshore 
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Renewables in Lowestoft to provide office accommodation targeted at SMEs in the offshore 
renewables sector and giving them access to R&D expertise (Real Power, 2005: 18).  
 
In the late 1990s energy minister John Battle proposed eight OSW demonstration projects as 
part of plans to meet a 1997 election promise of 10% of electricity to come from renewables 
by 2010. This initiative followed lobbying from the wind industry for more investment in 
OSW, referring to rapid increases in OSW capacity by Denmark and Germany (ENDS 1997; 
interviewee 11). During this time a number of small, engineering-based companies were 
trying to develop OSWF in the UK and applied for EU and UK funds.  
 
3.3 2001?2007:,early,offshore,wind,experiments,
The UK’s first OSWF in Blyth started operating in 2001 (Bilgili, Yasar et al. 2011). In the 
same year the Crown Estate (CE) awarded 13 Round 1 leases for OSWF (Toke 2011). The 
CE is a company set up by government to manage Crown owned land which includes most of 
the UK seabed outside the 12mn zone. Its profits go back to the Treasury. Developers need a 
license to develop an OSWF and have to pay a fee to the CE. The government also 
announced capital grants for OSWF under which projects received up to £10m (BWEA, 
2010). However, developments on the ground were slow (see Figure 3).  
 
In 2003 the CE announced a second round of licenses, focused on larger farms intended to 
provide 6GW of capacity by 2010 (BWEA, 2003). OSW development was given a further 
impetus in 2007 when the government signed up to binding EU targets of 15% of energy to 
come from renewables by 2020 which acted as a powerful driver for RET policy (Toke 
2011).  
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3.4 2008?,2012:,accelerated,ambition,and,commitment,to,offshore,
wind,
The most recent period is characterised by a step change in government involvement in 
OSWF as well as rapid deployment (Figure 3). During this period, the UK turned from a 
relative laggard in terms of RE deployment (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006) to a frontrunner 
in terms of OSW installed capacity (Toke 2011). 
 
source: own illustration, data from Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010 and DECC 2012 
 
Given the challenging renewables and climate targets, the Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) argued that large scale industrial development of OSW is essential to bring 
Figur e 3: Number  and cumulative installed capacity of offshor e wind far ms in the UK 
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costs down so that the technology could contribute to the targets (DECC 2009). A variety of 
support schemes for OSW were set up (see details in section 5.1). 
 
One important element was a change of the Renewables Obligation (RO), which had done 
little to support OSW (Woodman and Mitchell 2011). In 2009, the government introduced 
technology-based ‘banding’ for Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROC) to offer greater 
support to more expensive technologies. The ROC scheme works by providing generators 
with certificates for every MWh of electricity produced. Under the banded RO OSW received 
1.5 certificates/MWh compared to 1 certificate/MWh previously (Woodman and Mitchell 
2011: 3919). This was revised to 2 certificates/MWh in 2010 as an ‘emergency response’ 
essential to the continued development of OSW (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010: 94).  
 
Another important element of this acceleration process was Round 3 of the Crown Estates’ 
licensing in which 9 zones with a potential for 25GW were offered. While in Rounds 1 and 2 
developers bid for self-proposed sites, the CE now became more strategically involved, 
identifying zones which had the greatest economic potential. The CE also started to co-invest 
alongside developers and implemented a new Zone Appraisal and Planning process designed 
to reduce risks to project delivery and accelerate the programme.  
 
Ongoing changes to electricity market rules are intended to incentivise investment in low 
carbon technologies including OSW, nuclear power and carbon capture and storage. A 
package of instruments, including paying electricity providers a fixed premium price above 
the electricity price (so-called ‘contracts for difference’), is currently going through the 
legislative process (Kern, Kuzemko et al. forthcoming). 
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Amid these developments OSW capacity reached 2.7GW, making the UK the world leader in 
deployment (DECC 2012) even though between 2004 and 2009 the capital costs of OSW 
doubled from £1.5m/MW to over £3.0m/MW, making it the most expensive commercially 
available RET (Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010). What explains this boom in deployment and 
increasing policy and industrial commitment? 
 
4. The,creation,of,protective,space ,for,offshore,wind,
4.1 Main,actors,and,their,networks,
The recent deployment of OSW is led by a number of large utility and energy companies 
(Table 1). For a more extensive overview of actors involved in OSW, please see Appendix B. 
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Table 1: UK offshore wind farms 
!
Specialised project developers like Renewable Energy Systems or Mainstream Renewable 
Power are becoming important players (interviewee 6). Also civil engineering contractors 
like Balfour Beatty are increasingly involved in developing transmission infrastructure 
(interviewee 12). Turbine manufacturers, i.e. Vestas and Siemens, have featured heavily 
(Breton and Moe 2009). Other companies like the German small turbine manufacturer 
Daywind struggled to gain a foothold (interviewee 12). The UK does not currently have any 
domestically located turbine manufacturers but several firms have announced plans (see 
section  5.2). 
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Initially government had little interest in OSW. However, in the most recent phase a number 
of departments have been very active. DECC is the policy lead on OSW and in charge of key 
policies such as the RO and the Electricity Market Reform. The Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) is interested! in! stimulating! a! UK! supply! chain! in! offshore!renewable!energy!(interviewee!3).!The!Treasury!is!important!in!funding!decisions!and!controlling!public!spending!(interviewee!4).!Ofgem,!the!regulator!of!gas!and!electricity!markets,!plays!an!important!role!being!responsible!for!the!rules!on!grid!connections!etc.!!!There! is! also! a! variety! of! at! least! partly! publicly! funded! organisations! which! are!increasingly!involved!in!OSW,!including!the!Engineering!and!Physical!Sciences!Research!Council!(EPSRC),!Carbon!Trust,!Energy!Technologies!Institute!(ETI),!Crown Estate (CE), 
National Renewable Energy Centre (NAREC) and the Technology Strategy Board (TSB). 
The CE has! taken! a! very! proactive! role.! Aside! from! managing! the! leasing! rounds!described! earlier,! it! also! started! to! coJinvest! in! developing! projects! and! proactively!supports! OSW! in! a! number! of! other!ways! (e.g.! organising! supply! chain! events).! This!forwardJlooking!engagement!of!the!CE!has!been!praised!as!a!“visionary,!bold!step!which!has!moved!the!whole!industry!on” (interviewee!5;!also!interviewee!8).!!
Importantly, OSW also has enthusiastic support from environmental NGOs including 
Greenpeace, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Friends of the Earth and WWF 
(Toke 2011: 528). 
 In!terms!of!networks,!one!of!the!central!organisations!is!RenewableUK!(formerly!known!as! BWEA),! the! trade! body! around! which! the! offshore! wind! industry! has! galvanised.!Since! 2002! BWEA/RenewableUK! has! organised! yearly! OSW! conferences! which! have!
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grown!to!5,000!visitors!in!2012!(RenewableUK!2012).!Initiatives!like!the!TSB!offshore!renewable!energy! ‘catapult’ are!aimed!at! facilitating!knowledge!sharing! from!existing!offshore! engineering! expertise! to! accelerate! the! commercialisation! of! offshore!renewables!(TSB!2011).!!!In!addition!there!has!been!an!increasing!formalisation!of!publicJprivate!networks.!The!Offshore! Wind! Developers! Forum! (OSWDF)! is! a! network! of! developers! aimed! at!discussing!common!problems!facing!the!industry.!It!was!set!up!by!the!Crown!Estate!in!2010!and!is!jointly!chaired!by!the!Minister!for!Energy!and!Climate!Change!and!the!CEO!of! ScottishPower.!A manager from a utility company sees the network as very!helpful! in!terms!of!‘having!a!united!position!as!an!industry’ (interviewee!6).!In!2011,!DECC!set!up!the! Offshore! Wind! Cost! Reduction! Taskforce! to! bring! together! government! with!important!industry!players!such!as!Crown!Estate,!Alstom,!Gamesa,!Siemens, Mainstream 
Renewable Power, Vestas, DONG, Centrica, Lloyds Banking, E.ON UK, EDF, RWE Innogy, 
ScottishPower, Statoil, Vattenfall and SSE Renewables.!It!is!chaired!by!Andrew!Jamieson,!Chair! of! RenewableUK.! Both of these networks have high-level access to government 
ministers.  
 
In summary, a highly networked coalition of powerful and resourceful actors emerged which 
helped boost the credibility of and channelled resources into OSW. Formal networks centre 
around key public organisations as well as incumbent energy regime actors. Small 
independent companies which were very active in the beginning have fallen away or play a 
minor role. Environmental groups also helped create space for offshore wind by supporting 
the technology. 
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4.2 Narratives,
Analysis of the narratives actor networks used to enrol support for OSW, identified a range of 
frequently used claims. These portray offshore wind as: 
- helping to meet renewable energy and carbon reduction targets; 
- contributing to energy security; 
- creating jobs;  
- utilising a currently unexploited resource ; and 
- escaping from onshore wind planning issues. 
The most obvious narrative is that the technology is key to meeting renewable energy and 
carbon targets as well as tackling energy security. After agreeing to the EU targets several 
government publications argued that OSW “will play an important part in meeting Britain’s 
renewable energy and carbon emission reduction targets as well as improving energy security 
by 2020 and beyond” (BIS and DECC 2009: 20; DECC 2009). Energy security issues were 
also listed as one reason for supporting OSWF development in the 2007 Energy White Paper. 
Also the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) concluded: “there is an important role for 
offshore wind as part of the least cost path for decarbonising the power sector” (CCC 2010). 
Wind industry proponents even argued that “At a time when climate change climbs to the top 
of the political agenda, wind energy continues to be the only advanced technology ready and 
able to deliver renewable power on a large scale” (Real Power, 2006b: 2). 
 
Already in 1998 Border Wind claimed that a UK wind energy industry could create 36,000 
jobs by 2010 (ENDS 1998). However, it is in the most recent period, during a time of 
economic recession, when rhetoric about re-balancing the economy away from financial 
services towards manufacturing became salient, that this narrative has gained traction within 
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government. OSW is portrayed as a key sector in which the UK can create economic value. 
Advocates were asking for serious state backing to kick-start private investment by referring 
to promises of an additional 70,000 jobs and a £60 billion economic boost by 2020 (Real 
Power, 2010). A senior civil servant in DECC argued: “it is my judgement given that this 
[deployment support] is funded from consumer bills, it is not credible for me not to take an 
interest in the jobs argument” (interviewee 13).  
 
Another narrative was the availability of an unexploited resource and offshore engineering 
skills (Real Power, 2006: 6; interviewee 1; 3). Civil servants indicated that a key starting 
point for the Low Carbon Industrial Strategy was to identify where the UK has a natural 
opportunity: in offshore wind “we have better resources than anyone else proportionally” 
(interviewee 13). Such claims were repeatedly made by actors including BWEA (Real Power, 
2007: 3), the Carbon Trust (2003: 29) and the government’s Technology Innovation Needs 
Assessment (LCICG 2012: 1). Interview evidence indicates that this narrative was very 
effective with politicians (interviewee 8). 
 
Another strategy was to position OSW as an escape from the onshore wind planning and 
public acceptability issues (interviewees 4; 5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12). The CEO of DONG is 
reported to have said: “We’re going offshore, offshore is invisible…we don’t bother any of 
the inhabitants, we don’t change the landscape onshore” (interviewee 9); also see (Trident 
Energy, 2011). This is also purported to have been a strong motive for policy makers to 
support the move offshore (interviewee 10); also see (Jones and Eiser 2010).  
 
However, OSW has also been contested. For example three projects in Scotland were shelved 
in March 2011 due to local opposition, e.g. Wigtown Bay (interviewee 3). Also, wind 
17 
subsidies have been argued to increase electricity prices (e.g. see public letter written by 100 
mainly Conservative MPs to the PM in Feb 2012). Also the CCC voiced concerns about the 
cost of OSW and argued that the government should limit the amount of OSW contributing to 
the 2020 target and focus on the most cost-effective options (2011). Toke argues that the 
extent of the British OSW programme “is likely to depend heavily on consumer reactions to 
price increases” (2011: 526). A Reuters analyst also raised the question why Britain is 
placing so much faith in offshore wind although it “is the most expensive green power 
technology” (Wynn 2013). In response to such pressures, the Prime Minister insisted that 
while renewables are low carbon, they also need to become low cost (Endsreport, 26 April 
2012).  
 
The analysis shows that advocates of OSW were drawing on a range of supportive narratives 
that align with wider political and social goals (such as climate change mitigation, energy 
security, creation of jobs). Key networks succeeded in presenting a credible and appealing 
image of OSW to funders, policy makers and the general public, helped by the re-emergence 
of industrial policy considerations on the political agenda. While similar narratives are also 
used to advocate other RET such as PV (Smith, Kern et al. 2014), we argue that the interest 
shown by large energy firms in combination with support from key public bodies gives them 
particular weight. OSW satisfies the economic and political interests of key actors: Politicians 
are committed to meeting renewables and carbon targets, creating new jobs, and want to 
avoid public backlash against more onshore wind; the Crown Estate is interested in creating 
revenue from offshore leases, as is the Treasury; and for the utilities and investors this is a 
new business opportunity. In this sense OSW can be seen as a mutually beneficial state-
capital alliance in what Newell and Paterson have described as climate capitalism (2010). 
This does not mean that OSW was not contested as shown above. However, challenges from 
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residents, analysts and advisors have (so far) not been influential enough to undermine OSW 
advocacy. 
4.3 The,creation,of,protective,space:,summary,
In summary, the argument is that over time the multitude of narratives supporting OSW and 
the increasingly influential actor networks involved in voicing them have contributed to a 
rather beneficial situation for OSW in the UK. The situation was very different in the initial 
phases described in sections 3.1-3.3 where a number of small independent companies, 
environmental groups and academics tried to create a protective space for OSW and wanted 
to transform incumbent electricity systems. While the 1970’s oil crisis put some pressure on 
incumbent firms and governments to explore alternative forms of energy and stimulated early 
interest in OSW, advocates struggled to mobilise sufficient resources and obtain political 
buy-in at the time. For example an interviewee remembers: “In the early days the UK was 
very strong in the wind sector, you know, when it was an initial R&D idea. It was very much 
an academic space and then it lost it and it all went to Denmark [because of a lack of funding 
in the UK]” (interviewee 1) (see section 5.1). Being in such a difficult economic environment 
several smaller contractors involved in early project went bankrupt because of cost overruns 
(interviewee 8) (see section 5.2). Other small players were taken over (e.g. Wind Energy 
Group was taken over by Vestas and Borderwind was taken over by AMEC, a consultancy, 
engineering and project management firm mainly working for the oil and gas industry). The 
management of Borderwind early on was aware of the fact that to play an important role in 
offshore wind a larger company was required so they sold Borderwind to AMEC 
(interviewee 5). However, this also meant that important and resourceful actors entered the 
offshore wind niche. 
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Only later on the emergence of climate change on the political agenda provided a window of 
opportunity for OSW advocates to obtain protective space to enable further development and 
deployment. In this later phase the Crown Estate became a very proactive and a trusted actor 
with close links to government and other public bodies while also being credible with 
business actors. The CE therefore can be seen as a ‘system builder’ in Hughes’ sense (1979) 
who related ‘everything to a single central vision’, reached out beyond their special 
competences and played an entrepreneurial, system building role. These developments are 
argued to constitute the kind of ‘protective space’ the literature refers to.  
5. What,impact,did,the,‘protective,space’,have,on,offshore,wind,
developments?,
 
5.1 Shielding,of,offshore,wind,developments,
With OSW unable to compete with incumbent technologies, the analysis identified a number 
of specific processes shielding the niche from regime selection pressures that enabled its 
continued development.  
 
During the early period of our analysis, very few resources were spent on public R&D. What 
little R&D into renewables emerged in the 1970s ended in the 1980s. A member of a judging 
panel for the Science and Engineering Council in 1987-88 recalled: “We had a significant 
number of wind projects...We used to say the pump has been primed. We don’t need to fund 
any more research” (interviewee 12; also interviewees 10; 11). Public funding remained low 
until the mid-2000s (Figure 5). Since then energy R&D funding has been rising “prompted by 
the drive for efficiency improvements and overall cost reduction” (Halliday and Ruddell 
2010: 2). 
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Figure 5: Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) funding of wind research in £ 
 
Source: own illustration, based on data obtained from the EPSRC 
 
Ironically, some initial shielding for OSW deployment was provided by a policy mechanism 
introduced in 1990 to support nuclear power (the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation – NFFO) 
(Mitchell and Connor 2004). EU State Aid rules meant government also had to include 
renewable energy. NFFO contracts provided a small market niche for wind (219MW of 
installed capacity, mainly onshore) (Wood and Dow 2011). The follow-up instrument (RO) 
was introduced in 2002 and was designed to be technology-neutral. Only after the banding of 
the RO in 2009 did it make a difference to the economics of OSW (interviewees 6; 8; 9) and 
therefore stimulated significant interest by industry. For example in 2010-11 OSW received 
support of £256m through the RO (Ofgem 2012). 
 
Most recently , a range of initiatives have actively shielded offshore wind, including funding 
schemes to bring together actors, provision of incentives for upgrading port facilities and 
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funding to increase the capabilities of the supply chain. The research councils also started to 
put significant funding into the engineering skills base (see Table 2 for a list of initiatives). 
 
Table 2: Dedicated offshore wind funding schemes 
Source: authors own; data from a variety of sources, including interviews, public announcements 
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Looking at the impact shielding processes had on OSW developments, the argument is that 
the nature of the shielding provided by the policy framework (especially the RO) made a 
difference to the way offshore wind developed. The ‘protective space’ mainly provided 
shielding for a particular socio-technical configuration: large scale installations by big 
utilities or energy companies which were able to take on the risks and deliver the required 
scale of the activity and fund projects on their balance sheet whereas many of the smaller 
firms active in earlier phases struggled to do so. This also had an effect on turbine 
manufacturers. Companies like Daywind, which had developed small wind turbines mainly 
sold to cooperatives, small businesses and farmers in Germany, struggled to break into the 
UK market: “the people interested in wind were big developers or big construction 
companies” (interviewee 12) looking for large projects with large wind turbines –mainly 
provided by Vestas and Siemens. The analysis also showed that shielding initiatives have 
grown both in terms of funding and in numbers over the last few years which has given a 
substantial boost to innovation activities aimed at reducing costs and upscaling the size of the 
turbines (see next section).  
 
5.2 Nurturing,offshore,wind,
In terms of learning processes, a number of observations can be made. Actors were learning 
lessons from projects abroad such as Horn’s Reef in Denmark (interviewee 5) but UK pilot 
projects like Blyth were also important. One of the lessons learned was that increasing the 
turbine size was important to offset high costs and access higher wind speeds (interviewees 1; 
5; 11). The harsh operating conditions meant that turbines and foundations had to be much 
more robust than onshore. Firms are currently experimenting with a variety of different 
solutions (e.g. developing turbines without gearboxes or alternative foundations). Neither of 
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these problems have been resolved and there is no consensus about what the best solutions 
are (interviewee 11). Several of the publicly funded R&D schemes are trying to address these 
challenges (interviewee 1). 
 
The analysis also suggests that while technical learning was important, learning about other 
aspects of the socio-technical configuration was as crucial. Interviewees pointed to the 
importance of learning about suitable contractual arrangements across consortia (interviewees 
7; 8; 12). Cost overruns on fixed price contracts led to a number of small contractors going 
bankrupt in the initial projects (interviewee 8). While cost data from the early OSWF in 
Denmark were supportive of the idea of a downwards learning curve, costs started to go up 
during the mid-2000s. Research identified several factors behind price rises (for example 
Greenacre, Gross et al. 2010; ENDS 2006; BWEA, 2009). Arguably, without the political 
clout of OSW advocates as discussed in section 4, these cost increases could have threatened 
the future of OSW. Instead of cutting funding though, the government increased support and 
developers and public sector organisations started to work together ever more closely to 
nurture cost reductions. 
 
The analysis showed that during the earlier periods expectations for OSW were relatively 
low. However, this changed for a variety of reasons as argued above. The government’s 
Technology Innovation Needs Assessment contained indicative deployment scenarios for 
OSW ranging from 20-100GW in 2050 (LCICG 2012). The document also voices 
expectations that the OSW industry could contribute between £7bn and 35bn to UK GDP by 
2050 (cumulative). According to interview evidence, the government targets for renewable 
energy deployment, the specific scenarios for OSW and the scale of Round 3 projects helped 
to produce credible expectations  of a sizeable OSW market leading to increased commercial 
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interest (interviewees 1; 7; 8). The banding of the RO also led to a much better business case 
(interviewee 9). Several interviewees pointed to the shared sense developing across actors 
that in order to fit alongside conventional power stations and to be economical, OSW had to 
be bigger (interviewees 3; 5; 7; 8; 9; 10). To deliver on this expectation research projects 
such as Supergen as well as industry R&D focussed on scaling up wind turbines 
(interviewees 7; 11).  
 
Section  4.1 already showed the broadening of OSW networks from a few interested 
academics, NGOs and small engineering firms to include utilities, energy companies, civil 
engineering contractors as well as a range of public sector organisations. These networks 
were again broadened by turbine manufacturers interest in setting up production facilities in 
the UK (interviewee 1). Siemens is planning to build a turbine manufacturing plant in Hull 
and has received local planning permission for the £210m investment in May 2012. The 
factory is to produce 6MW turbines for Round 3 projects (Murray 2012). Turbine 
manufacturer Gamesa has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Forth Ports, Leith, 
Scotland to build a manufacturing facility (BBC 2012a). Areva has signed an agreement with 
Scottish Enterprise to site a new nacelle and blade manufacturing facility in Scotland (BBC 
2012b).  
 
The analysis above already showed the increasing resource commitment in terms of 
investments (see Table 1) and in terms of public support for OSW (see Table 2). The broad 
membership and the deepening commitments by these networks had a positive impact on the 
development of OSW activity. 
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5.3 Empowering,offshore,wind,
Empowering involves networks of actors representing niche configurations to the wider 
world in an attempt to mobilise resources for niche development and to help change the 
selection environment. Because the processes of representing niche configurations and 
mobilising resources have been covered in section 4, the analysis here focuses on changes to 
the selection environment. Arguably, actors have been quite successful in portraying OSW in 
a positive way and have received significant resources, but for OSW to become competitive 
with incumbent regime technologies either OSW improves up to a point when it can fit into 
the existing electricity regime (‘fit and conform’) or the selection environment is adjusted to 
accommodate OSW (‘stretch and transform’). 
 
The analysis reveals that there are a number of ways in which technology advocates, 
powerful business actors and policy makers shaped the selection environment to make it 
more amenable to OSW. The most important development in this context is the Electricity 
Market Reform . This represents a radical overhaul of the electricity markets rules in order to 
empower investment in low carbon generation by introducing long-term feed-in tariffs for a 
number of low carbon electricity technologies including OSW (Kern, Kuzemko et al. 
forthcoming). The contracts-for-difference guarantee investors an above market price for the 
electricity generated and will replace the RO by 2017. 
 
Another important instance of empowering is a change of rules implemented under the EU 
Third Energy Package (European Commission 2007). This EU policy did not allow OSW 
developers to build and operate transmission cables connecting the wind farm to the grid2. 
Several interviewees mentioned this rule as an obstacle to investment because any delay in 
                                                
2 Because of the separation of generation and transmission for competition reasons. 
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grid connection will lead to a loss of revenue. Following pressure Ofgem addressed this 
concern by allowing the ‘generator-build option’ (Crown Estate 2011b).3 In the words of a 
government minister: ‘we had to get Ofgem to stop being pedantically market driven’ (cited 
in: Toke 2011: 528) which addressed industry concerns (interviewees 6; 8; 12). 
 
A third example of change in the selection environment is an alteration in the planning rules 
for Round 3 projects. Special procedures were set up for large wind farms which were given 
precedence ahead of other considerations including the allocating of Natura 2000 
conservation sites (Toke 2011: 528). This was addressing industry concerns that planning 
processes were cumbersome and introduce delays (interviewees 3; 6; 8; 12). 
 
In addition to these examples of ‘stretch and transform’ empowering, advocates also utilised 
‘fit and conform’ strategies. For example the recent emphasis on cost reductions is part of a 
strategy to make OSW at least competitive with other low carbon options if not conventional 
generation. 
 
In summary, we argue that these empowering processes have contributed to the further 
development and deployment of OSW by helping to overcome some specific barriers but also 
by providing ‘political signposts’ that the government is serious about OSW. As a renewable 
energy developer put it: “That’s made quite a difference I think, just generally because it 
gives people more confidence in the higher risk development stage to invest. So planning 
reforms and electricity market reforms which have been much more heavily dominated 
towards offshore wind than ever before” (interviewee 8). 
 
                                                
3 Under this model, the OSW developers build the transmission infrastructure as part of the overall project and 
then sell off the asset once the OSWF is up and running. 
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5.4 Summary,of,shielding,,nurturing,and,empowering,processes,
Table 3 provides a summary of the main findings of the analysis. 
Table 3: Summary of empirical findings regarding shielding, nurturing and empowering 
  
It was not always straightforward to categorise certain empirical phenomena as exclusively 
contributing to only one of the three processes. For example in section 5.1 several initiatives 
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such as the provision of R&D support or the establishment of doctoral training centres have 
been categorised as contributing to the shielding of the OSW niche (as they create financial 
support for OSW without which there would have been little interest). However, the same 
initiatives also contribute to nurturing processes as they help to build networks and stimulate 
learning processes. While the framework separates these processes, it is important to 
acknowledge that empirically they are much more intertwined – indeed, smart policy would 
seek to stimulate all three.  
6. Discussion,
Section 4 analysed the activities of the actor networks advocating and negotiating support for 
OSWF. A key feature of that work is the recursive nature of outward-oriented socio-political 
processes (for securing discursive and material support for OSWF) with inward-oriented 
socio-technical processes (investment, technology development and deployment). Analysis in 
section 5 indicates that these actor networks and their narratives have constructed a fairly 
effective space for shielding, nurturing and empowering OSWF.  
 
OSW has also benefitted from a number of wider contextual developments. An obvious 
example is the political commitment of the UK government to addressing climate change 
combined with challenging EU renewables targets. However, this only became helpful to 
OSW through actor networks and narratives positioning the technology as contributing 
significantly to achieving these goals. This did not happen automatically – other ways of 
meeting the targets are conceivable.4 What is striking is the way OSW advocacy has actively 
negotiated alignments between the sector and shifting contexts. The socio-technical potential 
                                                
4 For example the UK transition pathways consortium developed a number of scenarios and the ‘Thousand 
flowers’ scenario contains a very small share of OSW only and instead relies much more on distributed 
generation and energy efficiency (Foxon 2013). 
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of OSW has had to be argued and demonstrated on various terms, but the general strategic 
line has been to stress the potential of OSWF to generate large quantities of low carbon 
electricity far from peoples’ local amenity concerns.  
 
Our analysis focuses on how OSW actors in the UK made use of these external developments 
(e.g. EU politics around renewables targets) and how their agency subsequently shaped 
developments in the UK. The framework is not designed to explain these wider political 
processes within the EU. There may be other external influences (e.g. electricity market and 
policy developments in Germany leading to a re-assessment of investment priorities of 
utilities like RWE)5 which are beyond the scope of our analysis but which might disempower 
OSW advocacy in the UK. Further conceptual work is necessary to explore how such 
external influences can be included within the suggested framework of shielding, nurturing 
and empowering. 
 
The fruits of aligning work became even more visible when OSW advocates had to confront 
developments that did not smoothly fit prevailing narratives, and where action was needed to 
‘stretch and transform’ selection environments. Rising costs, for example, run counter to 
concerns for the deployment of lowest cost technologies and assumptions about costs coming 
down. A significant political turning point was the government’s ‘emergency response’ to 
rising costs through the banding of the RO and enhanced incentives for innovation. RO 
reforms demonstrated government commitment to OSW, which increased market confidence 
that triggered investment. When it became apparent that costs were stubbornly refusing to 
                                                
5 For example in November 2013 the German utility RWE announced its withdrawal from a planned large 
offshore wind farm  in UK waters (Atlantic Array) which was interpreted by commentators as a blow to UK 
OSW ambitions. To what extent this decision was driven by OSW politics in the UK (e.g. the change of 
deployment support instrument from RO to contracts-for-difference) which is part of our analysis, or (external) 
policy and market developments in Germany (which is beyond the scope of the analysis) is an open question. 
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fall, OSW advocacy was able to maintain momentum by organising task forces and other 
activities to demonstrate increased efforts to reduce costs to maintain political support.  
 
Economic difficulties in the UK have further cast OSWF costs in a critical light. However, 
OSW networks are actively addressing these concerns. For example providing subsidies at a 
time of recession prompted attempts to identify what percentage of these subsidies were 
benefiting the UK. In 2011 E.ON commissioned a report examining the economic benefits of 
the Robin Rigg wind farm which concluded an average of 32% UK content (BVG, 2011). In 
response the Offshore Wind Developers Forum announced an ambition of 50% UK content 
for future OSWFs in February 2012. The Forum recognised that this was a crucial political 
issue: “I think it will be a real struggle for [offshore wind] to survive politically if it doesn’t 
increase its UK content” (interviewee 8; also interviewees 4 and 12). This commitment will 
shape the socio-technical configuration of the industry in the future. 
 
Indeed, such is the strategic fit with political concerns that institutional reforms to electricity 
markets and land use planning have been made to facilitate OSW deployment alongside CCS 
and nuclear power. Here the socio-technical scale of OSWF helps: it fits with other 
centralised forms of electricity generation. Critical to all this has been the alignment of 
political and economic interests around OSWF. The analysis demonstrated that it is not just 
what is being said, but who is saying it that matters. Investment and interest in OSWF comes 
from incumbents in the energy and utility sectors. After smaller and less powerful actors 
struggled for many years to establish a protective space for OSW, in the mid-2000s OSW 
became a project of joint interest of a variety of powerful actors who each saw OSW as being 
to their advantage: For the Crown Estate, this was an opportunity to develop an additional 
revenue stream; for DECC OSW contributes to meeting renewables and climate change 
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targets, circumventing contested onshore wind while potentially creating jobs; for the turbine 
manufacturers, contractors, developers and the supply chain OSW is a new market with 
growth potential; for investors this is a potential new field to make a return and for the 
utilities OSW is one way of meeting decarbonisation targets while preserving their business 
model.6 All of these actors are highly resource interdependent, meaning that they rely on each 
other to meet their respective interests. We argue that it is this resource interdependency in 
terms of investment, capabilities and skills, policy frameworks and legitimacy which 
provided the glue for the OSW network and which was absent in the earlier phases. 
 
Our analysis demonstrates how the close alignment of economic and political interests of key 
actors within the specific context of the UK has led to the rapid deployment of OSW – by 
circumventing anti-onshore wind protest in the short term and meeting 2020 renewables 
targets in the medium term but at potentially high economic and political costs when the 
further deployment of OSW adds up to a significant impact on electricity bills.  
7. Conclusions,and,policy,implications,
This paper has sought to explain the recent burst of activity in OSW in the UK by examining 
the dynamics of the development of ‘protective space’. We showed that a variety of public 
and private actors were involved in the creation of a ‘protective space’ for OSW since the 
1970s, initially with very limited effect. To create support for the niche actors strategically 
linked OSW to a variety of policy goals. While initially supporters had a hard time to enrol 
powerful private and public actors, developments abroad (Denmark and Germany) as well as 
changing contexts (including renewables targets and the recent focus on manufacturing jobs) 
                                                
6 Indeed a strong alliance between political actors and utility incumbents who realise that renewables cannot be 
suppressed any more is not unique to the UK but has also occurred in Germany with Vattenfall and E.ON being 
interested in developing OSW (Michaelowa 2004). We would like to thank one of the reviewers for alerting us 
to this parallel. 
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provided a window of opportunity for OSW advocates. An important role in this process was 
played by the Crown Estate who took the lead in bringing together actors.  
 
The analysis also suggested that processes of shielding, nurturing and empowering shaped the 
development of OSW in specific ways. For example early niche learning processes led to a 
shared understanding that OSW turbines needed to be larger and much more robust. Public 
and private R&D investment was channelled towards addressing these problems. We suggest 
that empowering OSW in this case was aided by the fact that the niche (at least in the later 
phases) was created by relatively homogenous networks of powerful actors promoting one 
socio-technical configuration (large scale offshore wind farms). The research showed a 
distinct lack of disagreement among advocates of OSW about the strategic direction although 
technical details vary. In addition, credibility was bestowed onto this technology by the 
interest and investment of utility companies, large manufacturing firms, oil and gas firms as 
well as DECC and the CE. In terms of the actors interested in OSW, these are closely 
associated with the existing regime as the configuration of multi-MW wind parks fits well 
into existing electricity regimes. 
 
We argue that the framework suggested by Smith and Raven explains the recent burst of 
OSW deployment in the UK through embedding these developments into a longer process of 
political struggles around the desirability and feasibility of the technology. The protected 
space enabled early processes of socio-technical configuring to take place by experimenting 
with the technology and different contractual arrangements but most importantly by building 
broad and powerful coalitions and aligning political and economic interests of key actors. 
When political pressure for the expansion of renewable electricity mounted, these coalitions 
were able to respond and rapidly deploy several GWs. The analysis provides a different kind 
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of deeper and historical explanation for the development of OSW compared to policy or 
economic analysis. In how far these lessons from the UK relate to developments in other 
countries remains to be seen, but the paper has at least demonstrated the usefulness of the 
perspective to explain UK OSW developments which is of relevance to other countries given 
the leading role of the UK. 
 
In terms of policy implications, two points can be made:  
First, the analysis shows that substantive change can happen (‘from laggard to leader’) when 
renewable energy policy ambitions link up with interests of powerful regime actors and tie in 
with economic concerns about growth, jobs and energy security, state revenue, and 
investment by manufacturers. The alignment of interests led to an increased legitimacy of the 
technology despite rising costs and thereby enabled the large scale deployment. For 
renewables advocates and policy makers, the analysis therefore points to the importance of 
building such coalitions in order to strengthen the case for RET. 
 
Second, the analysis shows that the existence of a ‘system builder’ was very beneficial for the 
development of offshore wind in the UK. The Crown Estate took a very proactive and multi-
faceted approach to OSW. In many other countries administrative bodies responsible for 
granting licenses are dominated by bureaucratic practices rather than an entrepreneurial 
mind-set. We argue that countries that are serious about the large scale deployment of 
offshore wind should look at the UK model and see whether the kinds of functions the Crown 
Estate fulfils (e.g. in terms of providing a platform for industry and government actors to 
come together, co-investing up to the point of consent, having a commercial mind-set and 
performing facilitative actions e.g. with regard to the supply chain) are present and if not, 
what kind of body might be set up to fulfil these functions. 
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Future research should analyse developments in OSW within the wider dynamics of energy 
transitions as different pathways interact with one another: both positively in terms of 
synergies (like the ones observed between offshore and onshore wind developments) but also 
in terms of competition (e.g. between centralised nuclear power and decentralised solar PV 
pathways). 
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Appendix,A:,List,of,interviewees,
 
Interviewee Position and Organisation 
1 Representative of Energy Technologies Institute 
2 Representative of Technology Strategy Board 
3 Senior Official from BIS 
4 Member of DECC offshore wind taskforce 
5 Engineering Manager at wind energy technology company 
6 Strategy and Stakeholder Coordination Manager at a large utility 
company 
7 Commercial manager at a renewable energy centre 
8 Manager at renewable energy developer 
9 Former DONG employee involved in economic and financial 
evaluations of offshore wind 
10 Senior researcher involved in wind energy research 
11 Senior researcher involved in wind energy research 
12 Professor involved in wind energy research; also involved in 
European Wind Energy Association 
13 Senior Official from DECC 
 
 
Appendix,B:,List,of,important,OSW,actors,and,abbreviations,used,
 
Actor Abbreviation Timing of their involvement in OSW 
Firms and business 
associations 
  
38 
Alstom  Alstom acquired existing Spanish wind 
turbine manufacturer in 2007; started 
developing dedicated OSW turbines in late 
2000s 
Areva  Interest in establishing manufacturing 
presence in UK since late 2000s; signed an 
agreement with Scottish Enterprise to site a 
new nacelle and blade manufacturing 
facility in Scotland in 2012 
Balfour Beatty   Active since late 2000s 
Borderwind  Active from the mid-1990s; involved in 
Blyth wind farm in 2001; later taken over 
by AMEC 
British Wind Energy 
Association; later 
RenewableUK 
BWEA Active promoter of wind energy since 1978 
(initially mainly onshore wind); since 2002 
dedicated OSW conferences 
Central Electricity Generating 
Board 
CEGB Explored OSW in the 1980s; abolished in 
1990 
Centrica  Invested since 2000s 
Danish Oil and Natural Gas DONG Invested since 2000s 
E.ON  Invested since 2000s 
Gamesa  Interest in establishing manufacturing 
presence in UK since late 2000s; singed 
memorandum of understanding in 2012 to 
build manufacturing plant in Scotland 
Haldens   
Mainstream Renewable Power  Active since the 2000s 
McAlpine  Active in the 1980s 
Renewable Energy Systems RES Active since the 2000s 
RWE  Invested since 2000s 
Scottish and Southern Energy SSE Invested since 2000s 
Scottish Power  Interested since early 2010s; trying to 
develop several UK OSWFs 
Siemens  Provided turbines since late 2000s; 
received planning permission for turbine 
manufacturing plant in 2012 
Statoil  Invested since 2000s 
Tecnomare  Active from the mid-1990s 
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Vattenfall   Invested since 2000s 
Vestas  Provided turbines since early 2000s 
Wind Energy Group  Active since the 1980s; taken over by 
Vestas  
Windmasters  Active from the mid-1990s 
   
Public actors   
Carbon Trust CT Established in 2001; initially focussed on 
small-scale technologies but supported 
OSW since late 2000s 
Committee on Climate Change CCC Existed since 2008 
Crown Estate CE Actively promoted OSW since 2000 
Department for Energy and 
Climate Change 
DECC Established in 2009 
Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills 
BIS Has taken an interest in OSW since late 
2000s when Low Carbon Industrial 
Strategy came out 
Energy Technologies Institute ETI Launched dedicated OSW programme in 
2009 
Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council 
EPSRC Provided limited funding for wind research 
since the 1980s 
National Renewable Energy 
Centre 
NAREC Established in 2002; active in OSW since 
late 2000s 
Office for Gas and Electricity 
Markets 
Ofgem Established in 1990 
Technology Strategy Board TSB Established in 2007; active in OSW since 
late 2000s 
   
Private public bodies/networks   
Offshore Wind Cost Reduction 
Taskforce 
 Set up in 2011 
Offshore Wind Developers 
Forum 
OSWDF Set up in 2010 
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